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The Stepwise Tutorial to Vehicle Suitable For Safe Use Declaration Form

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Instruction of Vehicle Suitable For Safe Use Declaration Form

thanks to everyone for coming today Iappreciate you being here I'm here totalk about a case study of Toyotaunintended acceleration in softwaresafety the slides are available on myblog it's actually served by CMU as of afew minutes ago so if you miss anythingthese slides are pretty dense you can goback and get the information so thatduring the talk I'm going to give anoverview a brief history of the eventswe're talking about billions of dollarswith Abi's so this is a big deal we'regoing to talk about a technicaldiscussion of the problems and import Iwant to emphasize now this is a casestudy my purpose and standing here todayis to educate and inform people what thefacts are this is about understandingwhat happened so as engineers aseducators we can take this informationand do a good job on future systemsbecause as you all know computers aregetting into cars in a big way and it'simportant to get this stuff right orelse people are going to die so that'swhy I'm here today what does it mean forfuture automobiles well you've seen inthe news lately news about GeneralMotors and Honda announced that therewas a bug in their software that causedunintended acceleration and some peoplebelieve that this would not havehappened if the toyota case hadn'talready been in the news so one way tolook at this is these events arereshaping how the auto industry seessoftware-based safety and I hope thetrend continues to improve that now fulldisclosure I testified as a plaintiffexpert witness so the plaintiffs wouldbe the victims their families theeconomic loss class I saw a whole lot ofstuff I did not actually see the sourcecode I saw lots of confidentialengineering documents I didn't actuallysee the lines of source code due to someprotective orders but there are otherfolks who did and so for the source codedetails I'm relying on what they said sothis is not all just my information I'mtaking all the publicly availableinformation I can find on the case andtrying to synthesize the whole storyrather than just my piece and there aresome things I can talk about and somethings I can'tthere'd been reports of unintendedacceleration for Titus and and in factthe reports of unintended accelerationfor many different vehicles fromdifferent manufacturers but they'd beenany it's an apparently increased numberof reports for Toyotas in particularsince the early 2000s and this is a 2002model year came out but this all came toa head on August 28 2009 when a titleLexus es350 sedan so a Lexus also hasToyota electronics in it reached ahundred miles an hour plus on a freewaycrashed and the occupants were on thephone to 911 before in depth at the timeof the crash and unfortunately tragictragic accident all four occupants werekilled now the driver is special in thiscase the driver was Mark sailorhe's a 45 year old male CaliforniaHighway Patrol officer that's a statepoliceman job in California and his jobwas vehicle inspector and so you wouldexpect he's very proficient at operatingvehicles the crash was blamed on longfloor mats causing pedal entrapmentso what pedal entrapment means is you asthe accelerator pedal i I mean formallycall it a gas pedal but it's anaccelerator pedal and that the floor matgets up on top of the eighth gas pedaland keeps it pushed down to the flooryour engine's going to try and getmaximum power you can have a wide openthrottle situation and so the the blameof the crash the blame before the crashwas placed on that and in this case asI'll I'll mention in a few slides if youtry and break the brakes will notnecessarily overcome that open throttleand in fact there was evidence ofendured braking so basically layman1turns the brakes were burned up on this1car and the throttle was open and this1incident made a lot of news and it1triggered an escalation of1investigations that have been started1back for the 2002 model year but when1this hit the news a lot of things1started happening there had been floor1mat recalls and again I'll explain in a1minute the brakes may not mitigate this1open throttle so they've been floor mat1recalls from September 20071but after this mishap made the news1those recalls were widened but then they1found out that these kind of mishaps1were happening in cars where the floor1mats could not possibly be to blame we1did the floor mats are in your trunk1that's not what caused it or if it's a1model that's not subject to recall so1then they found out maybe we have a1sticky gas pedal situation so there's a1sticky gas pedal recall so stinky gas1pedal loosely is if you press down the1gas pedal you lift the foot up the1spring supposed to put it back up and1maybe that doesn't happen so they to1recall for those for January 2010 and1off then things started heating up1there's a congressional investigation1and the president of Toyota testified to1US Congress in February 2010 and in1April 2010 there was a thing called the1economic loss class action and that sort1of gelled into selecting a venue and a1judge and a class action is when a whole1bunch of consumers get together and have1a suit over product quality or something1like that by May we had some flan news1Toyota unintended acceleration is killed189 reads the headline I don't know if1that's a correct number or not but1that's the kind of headlines that were1going around and so this is this is big1news something to notice down below is16200 complaints now I've heard other1numbers this happens to be the number in1this article that's a lot of complaints1of unintended acceleration so at least1according to media it was gaining1momentum then so what happens next is1NASA gets called in said let's have the1smart folks at NASA take a look at this1and find out what's really going on here1and so a NASA team spent several months1from 2010 to 2011 investigating this and1one of the things they really looked at1was the electronic throttle control1system1ETCs and that's what we're going to be1talking about for the rest of today so1an ETCs called an electronic an engine1control module or an engine controller1is a piece of computer equipment that1controls the throttle it controls air +1fuel + spark and those three things1together make1engine power so it has complete control1over how much power the engines putting1out and when you press on the1accelerator pedal what you're doing is1you're sending some voltage signals up1to a computer but you're not controlling1the throttle you're just telling the1computer what you want to have happen it1runs some software and decides what to1do with a throttle notice that it1controls all the things we're going to1only talk about the throttle position1because in these systems throttle which1is air flow is the primary way of1controlling power and the computer just1suggests fuel and spark to to make the1the air produce the right amount of1power so we're just going to talk about1throttle but in fact it's controlling1everything this is what it looks like1it's a circuit board there are two chips1there the larger chip is the main CPU1the smaller chip is the monitor chip and1very loosely the main chip is supposed1to do the computations and the monitor1chip is supposed to ensure safety you1read the summaries that's how they1generally characterize it of course it's1more complicated than that and we're1going to talk about that as we go but1it's a two chip architecture of oh and1that's on monitor actuator pair that's1the kind of thing you see in cars and2it's supposed to do this is what2controls the engine now the electronic2throttle control system is2safety-critical by safety-critical what2I mean is that if it malfunctions it's2there's a pretty good chance someone's2going to die and one of the reasons is2that in these vehicles when the driver2pumps the brakes they lose their power2assist so let me explain how that works2when you have power brakes or assisting2braking what happens is when you press2your foot on the brake pedal there's2actually some vacuum drawn off the back2side of the throttle and the vacuum2amplifies your power by if you have2vacuum on one side of a diaphragm and I2on the other side it's going to help you2press the diaphragm down and that's how2it works but there's a vacuum reservoir2and every time you press the brakes to2release the brakes it has to equalize2the the pressure or won't release and so2you use up the vacuum and after a couple2three pumps of the brakes the vacuum is2gone and you have no more power is this2now what's supposed to happen is that2the vacuum is supposed to be replenished2if the throttles closed the2side of the throttle has led a vacuum it2replenishes the vacuum but the throttle2is wide open2there's no resistance to airflow there's2no vacuum and so you don't replenish it2so if you press the accelerator pedal2all the way down and the throttles wide2open and you pump the brakes the brakes2lose effectiveness after a couple pumps2because there's no vacuum anymore once2you've reached that state it takes a2hundred and seventy-five pounds of force2on the brake pedal to hold the car2against the wide open throttle not stop2it just hold it against it some cars are2more some cars are less if you remember2your physics one if you weigh less than2175 pounds standing on it isn't enough2you have to brace your back against the2seat in push we're talking doing leg2presses right 175 pounds is a lot of2force and this is across vehicles this2is nitsa data National Highway2Transportation Safety Administration's2is a government data and without vacuum2it's 15 to 43 pounds so we're talking2like a 10x change 8 to 10 X change so if2you had a software defect this is2hypothetical if you had a software2defect in the ETCs and it commanded the2throttle to be wide open then the brakes2are not necessarily going to stop the2car in pretty ordinary situations when I2learned to drive I was taught to pump2the brakes if there was a problem so if2you pump in there brakes then you're2gonna have a problem stopping the car2against a wide-open throttle and2Consumer Reports even as a video showing2this kind of effect so it isn't whether2or not there's a bug that's relevant2here what's relevant is because there2might be above software's bugs and that2bug might cause the fatality that makes2it safety critical software so the onus2is upon the designer to demonstrate that2that bug or such a bug is not there2that's what it means to be safety2critical you have to show you don't have2that bug now if you're right driving a2Toyota and this happens to you the2advice from NASA is primarily to shift2to neutral2so if you shift to neutral that2hopefully just as gauges the engine in2some vehicles the shift to neutral I2understand is controlled also by2software but we're2going there today you can also do a key2off while moving if you do the key off2you're gonna lose your power-steering so2I would think twice before I do that so2what did NASA conclude when NASA2concluded was they didn't find a smoking2gun2they had a tight timeline they had2limited information I'm going to talk2more about that in a second but they2they had some limits and what they did2they did not exonerate the system what2they said was we had some smart folks we3looked as hard as we could given time3and resources and information available3we assumed some information was correct3that was given to us and we could not3prove the hypothesis that a particular3defect caused the UA but proof that the3ETCs caused the report anyway was not3found does not mean it could not occur3in other words they failed to prove the3hypothesis it happened but they didn't3say they couldn't they just said we3didn't find the smoking gun after NASA3issued this report nitsa issued a report3and the US Transportation Secretary Ray3LaHood said there is no electronic-based3cause for unintended acceleration in3Toyotas this is a sound bite you often3hear that doesn't exactly correspond to3with what NASA said did NASA of3correcting fleet information and my hat3is off to the folks at NASA they had a3really really tough job and they worked3hard at it and I know they did the best3they could and I based a lot of what I'm3saying here today on their report they3had a tough time and they didn't3necessarily get all the information so3for example you saw two chips on that3circuit board right if you read the NASA3report you'll find out they mention the3second chip but all the analysis of the3software is about the main CPU all the3pages of data and the discussion is all3about the main CPU you don't see any3analysis of the monitor CPU you know the3one that's there to ensure safety you3don't see any analysis there also NASA3credited error correcting codes in RAM3in part for safety so if you've heard of3parity of memory or ECC and servers3where to talk about single event upsets3in a minute3but basically hardware memory can have3bit errors in it and use additional bits3in the memory to guard against those bit3errors to detect them or correct them3and NASA said they had err correcting3codes and apparently that's because3Toyota told NASA that they had air3cracking codes the exponent public3reports so these are folks hired by3Toyota to look hard and they believe3they did look pretty hard to see if they3could find something and they issued a3report all about this and they also said3that ECC for the main CPU chip although3they claimed error correction not error3correction and detection well it turns3out there actually is no error3correcting codes on the RAM for the 20053model year vehicle which is subject to3the master report it's just not there so3this the reality doesn't match what you3see in these reports okay3NASA issued its report and then the3economic loss class action happened I3was involved in this as well as some3other cases and what happened was Toyota3said we have lots of people suing us3over basically our product quality and3we don't want to admit that there's a3software defect we're not going to MIT3anything's wrong but we're going to3settle because we want to move on from3this this affects the 2002 through 20103models of Toyota and Lexus vehicles so3they settled for 1.6 billion dollars3it's a large amount of money car3companies do do you have a large volume3but it's large amount of money and3divide it by all the owners it's not a3huge amount per vehicle it's a pretty3big settlement and as part of the3settlement so they sent checks some of3you here might have gotten a check they3sent out checks toners and they also3promised a brake override firmware3update in recent models so what this3does is brake override technology is3when you press the brake pedal and the3software sees that the gas pedal is also3depressed it releases the throttle so3that brakes more effective getting over3that problem all right but not for all3the models look at the years most of3these models are 2008 starts in 20083starts in 2009 so the ODE older models3are not3to this recall in other words other than3the floor mats and the sticky throttle4pedals nothing's going to be done to4update the software now the brake4override firmware could be effective if4you have floor mat entrapment I'm just4going to continue on so book out4Schwartz trial so this happened this4settlement happened some cases settled4and then there was a first public trial4that had software in it so there in the4news you've going to see some toyota4trials where toyota prevailed but none4of those featured software so book out4is the first and only trial that's4actually gone to a jury and go on to a4courtroom where software is what figured4in it and i testified in this trial4along with with many other folks so in4october 2013 was this trial it was a4fatal crash of a 2005 toyota camry this4toyota camry is not subject to the4floormat recall it is not subject to the4sticky pedal recall and is not a4candidate for the brake override4software just so we're clear on that4toyota blamed driver error for the crash4so miss book at was severely injured4mrs. Schwartz was killed by the crash4and if you look at the the if you look4at the news you can see a lot of details4about it but I'm going to keep it brief4so mr. Arora who works for exponent the4folks who wrote that report I mentioned4he testified as our software expert4about speak very shortly about what he4testified in another slide tied his4counsel theorized that his book out4mistakenly pumped the gas pedal instead4of the brake so they basically blamed4driver error on this she pumped the gas4bill instead the brake and then switched4the brake at the last minute so that was4basically their case the plaintiffs so4that folks working for Bukit Schwartz4blamed electronic throttle control4system I testified Michael Barr4testified and between us we said there4was defective safety architecture and4software defects that that more likely4than not4this crash also the plaintiffs pointed4out that there are a hundred and fifty4feet of skid marks which implies the4throttles open while the brakes are4being applied it went to jury and the4jury said that Toyota lost and the4plaintiffs prevailed and awarded each of4the plaintiffs one and a half million4dollars and also they checked the box4saying we do find by clear and4convincing evidence that defendants4acted in reckless disregard of the4rights so this is language that triggers4a punitive phrase of the phase of the4trial so that there was a jury verdict4in favor of plaintiffs the jury said we4want to proceed to punitive phase and4Toyota settled that night before the4jury could come back and consider4punitive damages so sometimes you'll4hear in the news that this case was4settled that's not the whole story the4whole story is that the jury rate ruled4in favor of plaintiffs on compensatory4damages and then it was settled before4the punitive damage phase now a summary4of the technical opinion this is a4reporter writing about what Mike Barr4said in the trial so Mike said there are4bugs that caused unintended acceleration4there are gaps and defects in the4failsafe so failsafe as a mechanism that4even if there is a problem in the4software or the hardware this failsafe4is going to take over and make the4vehicles safe and he said there are gaps4and defects he found software defects4and other defects in the system that are4linked to unintended acceleration4through vehicle testing and this wording4is tricky nobody very clear about it4there was not a situation we could press4some buttons press a pedal and make the4vehicle perform on demand the problem is4much more subtle and difficult than that4so we found pieces of evidence that he4chained together it's not a courtroom4demonstration where you press the button4it takes off just so we're clear about4that but the standard of evidence4doesn't require that he also found based5on some government testing results5another that the black box can record5false information so in a lot of these5cases they say it's Drive error because5the black box says the driver wasn't on5the brake well it turns out that that5black box is5always right we think of black boxes and5aviation as remarkable pieces of5engineering the automotive black boxes5are much simpler and apparently much5more prone to recording information that5isn't the whole story of what really5happened5he found that Stack Overflow and5software bugs led to memory corruption5and the memory corruption resulted in5the death of this task X we're going to5talk about task X so test died and it5turns out that that led to the that led5to the mishap that was his opinion and5he also said that a lots of task tests5were not detected by fail-safe so so5things didn't seem to work the way you5might expect in a robust safe system the5results were the jury awarded three5million dollars they settled before5punitive damages after that all the5federal trials got put on hold some5state trials proceeded but they all5settled before they went to court and as5of this summer there were hundreds of5cases pending you'll see different5numbers because some folks are counting5just the the federal cases and some are5counting some of the state cases but if5there's hundreds of cases some of which5are settled and some of which are not5settled then I'm gonna get the posed5again probably on this so this is all5ongoing and that's one of the reasons5I'm not going to answer questions now5something I didn't know until it came5out in the news was apparently four5years back from 2014 so that's about the5time of the conditional testimony the5Department of Justice had started a5criminal investigation and Toyota paid51.2 billion dollars to avoid for the5prosecution I'm not sure the exact5tricky phrases of the the legal phrasing5that goes there but basically they paid51.2 billion dollars to deal with the5situation this only covered floor mats5and sticky throttle pedals I've seen no5where in anything that this covers any5potential software defects they deferred5prosecution for three years for5interchange for the fine they said they5made fundamental changes to the5corporate structure and internal safety5controls and also they have an5independent reviewer that sits at Toyota5and make sure they do the right thing5okay let's switch over to the technical5point of view so NASA didn't find a5smoking gun but they found a lot of5stuff that is technically questionable5they had difficult assignment5Mike Barr and his folks had a little bit5more time they had different set of5resources they may have had better5access to some facts certainly they say5that they were in a position to build on5what NASA did and go deeper and go5further and look harder and so now5because the book out trial transcripts5had become public I'm here I can tell5all the pieces of the story put together5the jury found that dtcs defects caused5to death but they're not technical5experts now in fact I was very impressed5with this jury they really paid5attention they did a good job I really5think that they got it but they're not5trained engineers and so what I'm gonna5do is I'm going to tell you I'm gonna5summarize some of the things that were5found so you can decide for yourself5what you think you would decide if5you're on a jury you should consider a5practices circa a 2002 model year so5what we know today doesn't really apply5to a car that was sold in 2002 right you5have to so but go into the Wayback5Machine and look at what the state of5the practice was back then now some of5the cars are newer that's interesting5but we're just going to worry about what5what the world was like for 2002 model6year and just stop there the unintended6acceleration I I would consider loss of6command or authority over the throttle6you do some of the throttle and and the6car doesn't do what it you would expect6it to for that throttle command you6should consider if reasonable care was6used they don't have to be perfect6they have to exercise reasonable care6and you think about accepted practices6at that time and the standard of6evidence this as a civil matter not a6criminal matter the civil and civil6tries it's more likely than not 516percent it's not beyond reasonable doubt6so the jury was asked you know do you6think it's more likely than not that6software defects caused this mishap so6that's the the mindset to use one look6at these facts okay let's look at the6architecture electronic throttle control6system architecture this is a simplified6diagram6if you go to the NASA report you notice6all my sources are cited here in the6NASA report you can find a more6complicated version there's two chips6this is the monitor ASIC this is the6main CPU so there's troops to ships we6saw this is the small chip this is a big6chip and you can see there's a lot of6redundant singles these are two signals6for the accelerator pedal two for the6throttle angle whose control goes in6here a transmission shift selector goes6in here so we see some transmission6information vehicle speed we're just6going to talk about the throttle command6it's about a quarter million lines of6code seems like a lot but there's a lot6going on here it's doing cruise control6it's doing fuel optimization there's a6lot of stuff going on so okay I can see6that that's a reasonable amount of code6for this now what car companies do is6they more than anything else is they6test and so when you look at this and6say they had this code but they tested6it so question is doesn't testing make6things safe and the answer is in the6safety critical community we know that6testing isn't enough there are too many6possible tests there's lots of6operational scenarios there's failure6types that's timing and sequencing and6they're all there different combinations6you're just never going to see all the6combinations and testing it's just not6practical now I didn't say don't you6testing testing is great you should do a6lot of testing but testing doesn't get6you all the wait is safe and it's an6example of that there's an academic6paper and you can see these all predate62002 by but when Fanelli that says if6you want to get one catastrophic failure6every hundred million hours you have to6test for more than 100 million hours you6have to test for longer than the6deployed life of the system for the6testing to say nothing really bad will6happen or another way to look at it is6if there's an event you care about you6have to test three to ten times longer6than meat than the mean time between6events to make sure you actually know6what the number is and these events are6infrequent enough it's just not6practical to test that much so Toyota6said they tested 35 million miles across6five vehicle years and 11 million hours6of module level testing if you do the6math that's one or two hours per vehicle6produced so stuff that's going to happen6all the time on the road they're going6to find in testing and the rare events6that only happen once or maybe no times6while you own the car6you're probably not going to find that6during testing or if you see it you see6it once and you're not sure it was and6what it was and it doesn't reproduce so6in the safety critical community6computing community we know that vehicle6testing is just not going to find6everything you need you have to do6something else and there's something6else that's been around for a long time6is using a concept called safety6integrity levels a SIL approach so what7you do is you've been up how critical7the system is and in automotive7according to the Mishra software7guidelines I'll get to that in a second7you say if the vehicle failure is7completely uncontrollable that's so for7if it's difficult to control that SIL 37and I would say this sounds like SIL 37because if you catch some breaks are you7really strong you know maybe even if you7lose the vacuum you can still bring the7vehicle to a stop if you're at low speed7you might be able to if you have enough7room but they're going to be cases where7an average driver just isn't going to be7able to and it's SIL 3 and above and7expected outcome for at least some of7the events is someone's going to die and7that's what we have here so you map it7to a to an integrity level and then7based on the integrity level you do some7things now this isn't just misra this is7what lots of guidelines do chemical7process control there's a newer7automotive standard that also does it7but that's that postdates these vehicle7model yours real does it FDA doesn't7NASA does it FAA does it for aircraft7military says it for combat systems so7this general approach is very widely7accepted and it turns out that misra7which is an organization in the UK7created these guidelines in 19947specifically for automobiles this is an7automotive specific standard I should7say guidelines7it says guidelines on it so an accepted7practice for safety critical software is7to pick the relative set of standards or7guidelines figure out what your SIL is7and based on the SIL do you the right7level of process to the right level of7technical practices did the right level7of validation do the right level Quality7Assurance I'm going to talk about all7these things as we go so this includes7near-perfect software I put in quotes7and I said the word near of course7software isn't going to be one7perfect what you do is you exercise a7level of rigor commensurate with a risk7involved based on the severity of the7mishap so you certainly don't want the7quality of software that you're going to7see in your smartphone app controlling7your vehicle throttle you want something7better than that and how much better has7to do with the silt and we're gonna get7to that in just a second you don't want7any single points of failure and I'll7explain why that is because the failures7happen often enough you just can't7tolerate them you want good real-time7scheduling some other things good good7safety culture good software7architecture and we're going to go over7these more specifically so the mistress7software guidelines so these are the7things that came out in 94 95 if you're7so three on these guidelines there's a7handy little table and the yellow7indicates you have to do all these7things for specification design you need7to use formal specifications7mathematically precise specifications7for functions at that level languages7and Apollo's some of you might have7heard of the mistress C subset of the C7language that's what they're talking7about a safe subset of a language and7that's what it was designed for7relationships between Sall software7products and tools for configuration7management so you need F configuration7management you need to have white box7testing syntactic static analysis so7this is a static analysis tool7verification validation access for7assessment so you need your techniques7processes tools but down here you need7your design documents the training7structures software test results so to7even be cell to you should be able to7produce a list of all your software test7results okay so that's what the misra7guidelines say it sounds kind of process7heavy but people's lives are at stake so7that's what they recommend now what's7the required level of rigor there is no7certification requirement for u.s. cars8so if you want to fly in the airplane in8an airplane the FAA has signed off in8this airplane saying this is certified8to carry passengers in the US there's no8agency that does that the car companies8build a car and if they think it's safe8enough they can sell it they have to8follow FMVSS federal motor vehicle8safety standards but though8are more about things like do the lights8work the right way is the right8visibility on the headlights do the8brakes work effectively in terms of8stopping distance it doesn't really8address software safety it's much more8at the functional system level now the8US Department of Transportation can8require recalls and otherwise enforce if8safety problems are detected in the8field but this is a reactive thing the8vehicles are already out there before8this happens remember we saw about the8complaints and they monitor the8complaints in it's a system that works8that way the legal standards very8generally summarizing informally you8can't be unreasonably dangerous for the8intended purpose and again the8automakers were not required to follow8those misra guidelines I mentioned they8were available they could have followed8them if they wanted to but there was no8law that said in the US that they had to8I want to be completely clear about that8so what does Toyota claim they do not8claim to follow the guidelines they when8NASA did the report if you look through8the report you will not find an audible8auditable software process plan software8process plan is a waterfall model or a V8model usually in the automotive industry8where they say here all the steps we're8going to do for our process and NASA8didn't talk about taking that process8plan and auditing to see if they really8followed the process that's sqa they8didn't talk about that NASA also did not8disclose a written safety argument so8NASA didn't talk about any document that8said here's why we think we're safe and8here's the evidence to support that you8don't find the discussion of that in the8NASA paper excuse me Toyota's expert in8the book out trial offered two basic8opinions so the information we have8publicly this is basically their8explanation for why they think they're8safe they said they couldn't find a8realistic ETCs fault that explains what8caused the Bookout mishap8they looked at the system to some level8of detail and they didn't see anything8that could cause it also they said that8any realistic failure would be caught8and mitigated by fail-safes8so they said we looked hard we didn't8find anything and we're pretty sure to8some level degree not quite quite sure8what that level degree is but we're8pretty sure that you know if8something that happened a fail-safe8would have caught it that's it well8that's what they hang their hat on dance8when a public report basically does the8same thing and they also say same Fault8containment region fail-safes so the8fail-safes when I talk about fault8containment regions are in the same fall8containment region as the things that do8the action and and that's what they're8pinning their hopes on for the8fail-safes now let me give you an8example of the failsafe because these8previews so prominently in what's way8too says there's one called a break eco8check and again this is all publicly8available information the break echo8check very informally the brake pedal8state is read by one CPU it goes the8other CPU and they go back and forth to8make sure that both have the same idea8of what the brakes are doing sounds like8a good idea and if they mismatch it will8do a safety shutdown of the system and8it can detect some of these tasks X8deaths remember Mike Barth said task s8death was a big culprit in this and it8can detect some of those but it requires8a brake pedal transition it only does8the check on a transition not9continuously that means if your foot is9already on the brake and a UA occurs9then you have to take your foot9completely off the brake9not just release pressure but all the9way off a clean lift so that the brake9lights extinguish and then put your foot9back on and then the engine controller9should reduce engine power and the brake9should work okay if you pump the brakes9and you do not get a clean lift for a9certain amount of time and your9taillights don't extinguish then this9failsafe will not take effect9okay that's at the system level now I'm9going to talk about hardware then we'll9switch to software and I'm just going to9go through and say here's what people do9for safe systems and I'm gonna tell you9what Toyota did and I'll let you9conclude from that what you think now9one of the big things in safety critical9systems is we have to worry about random9Hardware faults so cosmic rays come down9bounce around create a bunch of9particles a particle storm high-energy9neutrons hit an atom in silicon throw a9charged particle up you get a little9surge of current and a bit flips from a90 to 1 or 1 to a zero and how big of a9deal is the bit flip well it depends9what the bits doing doesn't it and these9happen all the time here's some data9here's some data that shows on a bunch9of servers some of these service saw9more than a thousand of these in 169months so this happens all the time now9not every single minute but it happens9to your laptops it happens to every9computer it's expected now Microsoft9Word crashes maybe not a big deal but if9your engine controller gets a bit flip9that causes to misbehave it's a big deal9so in these kind of systems and9especially when you have millions of9vehicles and thousands of hours of9exposure per vehicle the numbers add up9you have to take this stuff into account9so safety or critical systems all have9to deal with this also by the way if you9have a software defect that can also9corrupt memory and most importantly when9you get a corruption it's not safe to9assume it just crashes and stops when9you get a corruption some fraction of9the time it will do something bad and9there's experimental data on this so9often do these happen it's not an9everyday thing basically you're going to9get a hardware fault every ten thousand9a hundred thousand hours per chip and9maybe two percent of these are dangerous9now this is a number from an academic9research paper I wouldn't put a lot of9digits of precision on that but you know9once in a while it's dangerous and if9you do the math there's a lot of just9Camrys built and vehicles get driven9just under an hour today and you9multiply them out even if you take the9the favorable end of the range you're9ending up with a dangerous fault we're9dangerous means potentially unintended9acceleration every 11.6 days just for9one model year of car so you can9regularly expect this to happen if9you're not protected against bit flips9you can expect this to happen that's why9you have to be protected against bit9flips to do that you can have err9correcting codes in memory which we9already talked about or you can have two9CPUs and assume that they fail9independently but you have to do9something and if you have software9faults of course this is going to make9the rates worse so every large deployed9fleet is going to have these kind of9problems and what's important is you9have to basically catch enough of them9that you're safe enough to be at the9required safety integrity level so to do9that you have to do a little bit of9fault turrent computing theory there's a9thing called a fake fault containment9region and the idea is if a fault9happens inside it stays inside if a9fault happens outside it stays outside9so if one of these bit flips happens9inside it cannot possibly affect by10design whatever it is outside that fault10containment region okay you have to have10isolation and that means because these10fought once a fault happens if you flip10it a bit in memory and it's like the10stack pointer who knows what's going to10happen right once you flip in mid memory10you cannot make any assumptions about10inside the fault container region you10have to basically assume it's going to10do the worst thing it can so that means10you have to have multiple fault10containment regions if you put a10failsafe and the thing doing the action10in the same fault containment region how10do you know the thing making the mistake10doesn't take down the failsafe10well you don't that's the point so what10people do is they make sure there's no10shared resource you need complete10independence multiple fault containment10regions so one of them acts in a bad way10the other one won't be corrupted because10that's the point of fall containment10regions and will be able to detect it10and do something so any shared resource10is a dangerous single point of failure10because it violates the concept of a10fault containment region now what you10see in rail systems is they'll actually10commonly put two computers next to each10other running the exact same software10which has been very very high quality10software and cross-checking so there's a10bit flip or something like that they10mismatch and if they mismatch they both10commit suicide and a backup pair takes10over that's how real signaling works10that's how a lot of train equip menteur10cars and some other equipment what you10often see is a monitor actuator pair10that's where10CPU does the computing and I monitor CPU10keeps an eye on and says I don't think10that's right we're going to do a safety10shutdown so complete protection requires10redundancy once you have a single point10of failure you have a problem a severe10problem so for example if you had a main10CPU and a monitor chip and you have to10we've done it remember there's two10redundant signals coming from the gas10pedal if you have two redundant signals10coming from the gas pedal and they both10go through the monitor chip and the10monitor chip suffers a nasty nasty10failure it could lie to the main CPU10about what what you're doing the gas10pedals10there's no way to insure with modern10electronics that can't happen it might10be low probability but it's not possible10to ensure it can never happen so what10you typically see in these systems is10you see that the throttle and10accelerator version 1 goes to the main10CPU version 2 goes mono chip and in the10monitor chip has a fault the main CPU10can keep it honest because it has a10clean copy of the other set of sensors10and it takes two failures to trick this10kind of system not one failure so let's10go back to what we saw for Toyota this10is electronic throttle control system10and you can see all the all the signals10coming through to a DD converter and10then they're actually copied up to the10main CPU does anyone see a single point10of failure on this diagram I'll give you10a moment that's a single point of10failure if the monitor chip has a fault10that causes it to send consistent but10incorrect values up to the main CPU10there is no way that means CPU can10detect it okay let's switch over to10software what about software buzz10couldn't it be software bugs10well mr. C I mentioned that one of the10things you want to do is use a safe10subset and I want to say a safe subset10what do I mean you all learned if you10have learned any C programming that if10you have a conditional statement and10there's a single equal in the10conditional statement instead of a10double equal that's pointing a loaded10shotgun at your foot pulling the trigger10halfway and waiting to see what happens10right you don't want to do that okay so10that's one of the mr. C rules saying11don't do that and there's 100 so rules11like that some of them were arcane some11less arcane but just this is a bad idea11because ether the language doesn't11really tell you what's supposed to11happen and who knows what the compiler11does or it's just the kind of thing that11just invites trouble so it's very common11practice today very common today for11people to use mr. C and even back then11mr. C was well known and people were11using it so there's an interesting piece11of research in 2004 from Toyota based on11their infotainment software that showed11that for every 30 Misra C violations you11would expect one major buck now again as11with the other number I wouldn't put a11lot of significant digits on this but11you know this says is a correlation11between mr. C rule violations and major11bugs and that's not the only publication11to make that kind of correlation so11let's talk about the Toyota code quality11they had a coding style and publicly11they said they had about 50% overlap11with the mr. C rules but when you look11more deeply you find out that only of 1111of the mr. C rules are actually in the11Toyota coding rules and that they didn't11follow their own rules for example NASA11found the one of the rules is a switch11statement should always have a default11and NASA found only 105 out of 34311actually had the default but that was11one of the coding rules11the reason Toyota gave for not using11Misra C rules and they had their own11coding rules they could have adopted mr.11C nobody made them but the reason they11get for not doing it is that the coding11rules they had written were written11before the 1998 mr. C standard came out11NASA found some rule violations but Mike11Barr was able as team was able to do a11full analysis they found 80,00011violations of Misra C now a reasonable11person would ask well are these the you11know maybe no big deal or you know how11big a deal are these well if you look at11the NASA report they did some analysis11and they found 2272 global variables11declared with different types so an11example of this and I'm not saying it's11in the code because I haven't seen the11code but when somebody says that I think11of something like well this module11thinks it's assigned int and11that one thinks it's an unsigned int and11if you get it wrong in your sign shift11operation you're gonna get a messed up11result all right so that's the kind of11bug we're talking about again I'm not11saying that that was necessarily in the11source code11they found 22 initialized variables uno11found 89 possibly uninitialized11variables let's talk about code11complexity one of the interesting points11of the transcripts is that we talked11about spaghetti code so spaghetti code11I'm going to say is incomprehensible11code due to unnecessary coupling jumps11go to s or high complexity now this11isn't actually about goto sits in C not11Fortran and you know I don't know of any11go to z' there but still if you have11messy code it's a problem and some11mccabe's cyclomatic complexity is a good11way to look at this this is well known11technique what you do is you take out11program flow control that graph and so11this is a two way branch and that's a11four way branch and you count up the11number of cycles in the graph the number11of eyes in the graph and and you add one11and that's the complexity so it11basically has to do it how many paths11you have to go down to test this code11that's really what it's trying to get at11and pretty common number is 15 20 maybe1130 you don't really want to be above 151120 30 because it's really hard to write11unit tests for this code that's a tough11number at 50 it's pretty common to read11its untestable at 50 and it's 75 there's11a good chance if you fix a bug you're11gonna inject another bug because it's11just too complicated to maintain so you11really want to be at 15 20 30 at 5011you've got probable at 75 you have big12problems the toady atcs code had 5012functions with a complexity over 50 the12throttle angle function this is a thing12computing throttle angle has a strict12complexity metric of 1 4 6 it's 1,30012lines long and there's new no unit test12plan in evidence ok moving along there's12another kind of spaghetti code global12variables are evil this is a chapter12title in my book which I wrote before I12got involved in all this stuff and I12didn't make it up Mary Shaw and bill12Wolfe wrote a paper called global12variables considered harmful in 1973 so12this is not news12and I think of it as dataflow spaghetti12you know it's very code only you know12think of an Excel spreadsheet for those12of you who aren't experts in this an12Excel spreadsheet where you have lots12and lots of cells and one cell randomly12looks at another cell with no particular12pattern which looks at another cell12looks another cell and there's a bug12there you're not going to be able to12track it down so it's dataflow spaghetti12the ideal number of glow of writeable12global variables is zero now there's12some things like cots like the value of12pi we're not going to worry about that12all right12and some configuration data but in terms12of Global's that are actually used to12communicate values for example in dtcs12the throttle angle is written by one12function and another function picks it12up out of a global and does something12else with it so they pass values along12by function at least for that the ideal12number of global variables is zero now12I'm an academic I'm glad to say that12alright in the real world which I've12also worked in the real world I've12written code that went into production12sure ten twenty you do what you got to12do to make it work okay but the numbers12supposed to be small Toyota had about1210,000 global variables in their code12and the majority of all data objects12were global in scope so this is not ten12thousand out of a huge number variables12this is ten thousand global variables if12you did the analysis which NASA did12about half of them could have been local12static which means it's inside a12subroutine and only visible to that12subroutine but in fact about ten12thousand work variables that were12visible to every line of code in the12system so if you want to track out down12who's reading and writing the variable12you have to track it down across the12entire code base let's talk about12concurrency so concurrency bugs are12tough race conditions are just the vein12of existence of embedded programmers and12the idea behind a concurrency problem is12you have some show data and task one12reads the data task two reads the data12they both change the data they both12write it back and at the end the value12depends on who wins and these tasks12aren't necessarily synchronized they12slide in in anaphase so a lot of times12it works fine but if the stars align12just the wrong way12gonna get corrupted data for example if12they're both incrementing a counter and12I'm not saying this is necessary in the12code it's just an example if they're12both incrementing a counter and they do12this the counter is going to increment12by one instead of two because they're go12both going to write the same value back12and the way around this is you disable12interrupts so task 1 will disable12interrupts before the read to lockout12task 2 so it can't run so it can't be12scheduled you could also use mutexes12which are or semaphores which are data12objects that keep the two tasks from12accessing the day at the same time if12you get this wrong you're going to have12bugs that are almost impossible to12reproduce but with millions of vehicles12and thousands of exposure hours per12vehicle it's going to happen it's just a12question of when and you can't reproduce12it you can't make it perform on demand12because it all depends on how the stars13align NASA actually identified a13specific concurrency issue of overriding13the results of a second interrupted task13however they said that that particular13defect did not lead to unintended13acceleration or at least they couldn't13prove that it did there's nested13scheduler unlocks so sometimes you lock13a variable call subroutine it locks a13variable you call subroutine it locks13the same of it the same variable and13then on the way out the first guy13unlocks it and remains unlocked all the13way out and so that's a concurrency13hazard the shared global variables are13not all volatile for those of you have13taken an embedded C course the keyword13volatile says as soon as you touch it13you have to commit the value to memory13you can't leave it hanging around and13register so if you go back here even if13they adopted properly if task 1 didn't13think it was volatile it might keep it13around in a register and write it next13year who knows when it's gonna write it13because it's cashing in a very in a13register and the keyword volatile says13don't do that if you don't use volatile13you can have concurrency defects even13though you've disabled interrupts and13done everything right and finally the13shared Global's are not always accessed13with interrupts maths NASA did the13analysis and they basically found more13global variables than interrupts so you13know the math doesn't work it couldn't13possibly be true but they didn't do a13lot of detailed analysis because it's a13lot of work they didn't have that much13time let's move on to recursion so13recursion is when you take CS 10113and you do the Fibonacci program it13called aterrizaje no he calls itself13right and that's a nice CS theoretical13construct but the problem is every time13you do subroutine call it puts stuff on13the stack this processor does not have13memory protection and it has a limited13amount of RAM so if you put too many13things on the stack by using unbounded13recursion you're eventually going to13overwrite memory the toady accs does use13recursion if stack is 94% full plus the13recursion it's very difficult to do this13analysis in the presence of recursion13there's no mitigation for stack overflow13so there techniques where you can put13Sentinel values down here and if they13get corrupted you know ever have a13problem they didn't use that and it13turns out the memory just passed the13stack that you would corrupt is the13real-time operating system area so if13you wanted to explain a task death this13corruption could explain a task death13another technique watchdog timers every13embedded system especially safety13critical systems should have a watchdog13timer here's the idea the idea is you13have a hardware timer and the hardware13timer counts down from some number and13if it hits zero what happens is it13resets the system all right and so the13tasks inside the microcontroller or pet13the watchdog timer once in awhile and13say it's okay I'm so alive I'm still13alive the counter goes up and it starts13counting down again and that's a good13way to reset an unattended system where13there's no control out the leader or13power switch available to you so to do13this one of the things you never never13want to do in an embedded system is use13an interrupt to kick the watchdog timer13just because the interrupts alive all13right you want to base it on that all13the tasks being alive not just interrupt13service routine decides to kick it13so what Toyota did was they had a13watchdog timer and they kicked it based13on the average CPU load over a period of13time so think about it if a task dies13the CPU load goes down and that looks13good right they did not look at our toss13error codes for TAS deaths they did kick13it with a hardware timer service routine13which I just talked about it and the13watchdog did not detect the majority of13task tests including task acts13so if test X which calculates the14throttle angle and has most of the14fail-safes14and sets most of the diagnostic trouble14codes if this task dies the watchdog is14not going to catch it last technical14slide let's talk about safety culture14safety culture is important if you I was14if you have an organization that is not14really in tune with safety who doesn't14take it extremely seriously then history14shows you're you're you're prone to14catastrophic events so one of the things14and this is out of the testimony there14was no knowledge at Toyota for some14parts of the V process now V is the14software development process so V starts14with high-level requirements you work it14down into subsystems - modules and then14you do test backup out the other side of14the V and there was no independent14certification for parts that they14couldn't or didn't check and by14certification of each safety14certification here's an example of14Toyota's unintended acceleration14investigation philosophy so the14gentleman who said this statement his14job is to look at vehicles a customer14brings a vehicle in says my vehicle had14unintended acceleration I want to know14what's wrong and his job was to come up14with the answer for what was wrong and14what he said was in the Toyota system we14have the failsafe14so a software abnormality would not be14involved with any kind of unintended14acceleration claim finally there's an14internal try to email that says in truth14technologies such as failsafe is not14part of the Toyotas engineering14divisions DNA continuing on as it would14as as is would not be a good thing and14this was in 2007 there's some other14issues I don't have time to talk about14all of them but there's poor isolation14of task functions so task X was called14by the the folks we analyzed at the14kitchen sink task because it seemed to14do everything remember the brake14override function that's supposed to14help with fourth floor mat and tap and14Trotman that's also in task X if you get14the 2010 Camrys version of software and14so if task X dies you lose the brake14override function as well the they use14the osek rtos which is a pretty common14automotive artist but it's not certified14as14the certified list and there are 8014percent cpu load for those of you took14me great monotonic scheduling theory14you'll recognize that it's greater than14about seventy percent and therefore you14can expect to miss task deadlines there14a lot of large functions two hundred14functions begin in seventy five lines of14non comment code 75s kind of arbitrary14but there's a lot of large functions you14saw the throttle was at 1300 lines the14peer reviews were informal and only on14some modules and peer review is a very14effective way to find defects but they14weren't rigorous about that there was no14configuration management14there was no bug tracking system in14there for no bug reports and no formal14specifications were used okay wrapping14up some legal concepts as I said before14but I want to remind everyone these are14civil trials not criminal trials so it's14not beyond reasonable doubt it's more14likely than not 51% is what matters and14for product defects if you're doing14product defects you ask yourself was14reasonable care exercised in design so14think about everything I said and ask14yourself did they exercise reasonable14care were they following accepted14practices at the time they were doing14the engineering you can't say what we do14today you have to look back and when14they were doing the engineering was it14unreasonably dangerous and defective the14intended use was it economic to cure the14defects and the defects have to be a14plausible cause of the mishap they don't14have to be the only possible one they14just have to be plausible and the jury14has to decide it's more likely than not14that the defendant or the plaintiff15should prevail and these aren't quotes15of any specific laws these are just15general ideas across various states okay15wrapping up if you look at my blog since15February 17th I've been posting my15expert witness report on this case on my15blog I haven't said it till now but15that's my expert witness report - the15paragraphs about Toyota so it's just15basically what I think the accepted15practice should have been at that time15if you notice some of the citations all15seem like from 2002 and earlier that's15why there's technical reporting and15these slides are available on the web so15I'm not going to go through them detail15but you can get some technical reporting15you Cote Yoshida is15a really good job of capturing this mic15bar the other expert witness I mentioned15you can see his slides from a15presentation he did there's a video of15pumping the brakes with a throttle open15NASA and it's I have the reports on mine15go read them for yourself15they're redacted there's significant15reductions but go read them for yourself15and the book out trial materials are in15line with very small reductions my15testimony is there mic bars testimony is15there his slides are there go look at15them for yourself it's a lot of pages15but it's very enlightening reading the15exponent public report from Toyota15experts is also available online and15there's a timeline from plaintiff15lawyers and I'm putting here who read it15because that that's relevant when you15read the document to know whose point of15view is being presented some15acknowledgments the NASA Twitter u1815review team had a tough job and without15their work I couldn't be here taught15today telling the story I'm telling so I15really appreciate the work the plenty of15source code review team led by Mike bar15but also Nathan Dan Nigel Carl Steve and15Doug did a great job they locked15themselves in this tempest room with you15know metal mesh or metal steel took off15their belt buckles were wanted for15security no cell phones had to go in and15live in this place for months at a time15because that's the only way they were15allowed to see the source code materials15so they did a lot of hard work to do15this and there many people have worked15on this topic the lawyers who decided to15take on this case one of them's here15today and others who have really made a15great great effort on this okay now15unfortunately I can't answer questions15because with a smart crowd the questions15immediately go to the parts I didn't15talk about and the reason and talk about15them is I'm not allowed to talk about15them but what we are going to do is I'm15going to give the microphone to my15senior grad soon15you

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  2. Work with your email to put an account, or sign in with Google or Facebook.
  3. Locate the PDF that needs to be signed on the device with iOS system or pull it from the cloud.
  4. Locate the part where you want to include the signature; pick 'Insert initials' and 'Insert signature'.
  5. Type your initials or signature, place them correctly, and save changes to the document.

After signing, the document is ready for the next step. You can download it to your iPhone and share it. As long as you have a great internet connection, you can sign and send documents in an instant.

How to create an electronic signature for the Vehicle Suitable For Safe Use Declaration Form on Android?

iOS has many of users, there's no doubt of that, but most mobile phone users have an Android operating system. To meet the needs, CocoSign has developed the program, especially for Android users.

You can gather the app on Play Market, install it, and you could start signing documents. These are the guides to sign a form on your Android device:

  1. If you already have a CocoSign account, sign in. If you don't have one yet, you can sign in using Google or Facebook.
  2. Pick on '+' to choose the document you want to sign, from cloud storage or using your camera.
  3. Locate the part where the signature must be placed and then use the popup window to type your signature.
  4. Include it on the page, confirm, and save the changes.
  5. The final step is to fax the signed document.

To send the signed form, just attach it to an email, and it will reach your receiver in an instant. CocoSign is the best way to sign lots of files every day, all at a cheap cost. It's time to forget all about signing document face-to-face and keep it all electronic.

Vehicle Suitable For Safe Use Declaration Form FAQs

Comply with the below common confusions about Vehicle Suitable For Safe Use Declaration Form. Talk to directly if you still have other queries.

Need help? Contact support

How can I make it easier for users to fill out a form on mobile apps?

Make it fast. Ask them as few questions as possible (don't collect unnecessary information) and pre-populate as many fields as possible. Don't ask offputting questions where the respondent might have to enter sensitive personal information. If some users see you collecting sensitive information, they might not be ready to share that with you yet based on what you are offering, and they will think twice about completing the form.

Recruiters have overcalled my references. How can I fill out a form and only use my references for 'real' positions?

This practice bums me out about recruiters farming references for business development opportunities. All jobseekers should hold off on providing references until they are well into the interviewing process. If references are required to start the process provide outdated numbers and names.

How do I fill out the SS-4 form for a new Delaware C-Corp to get an EIN?

You indicate this is a Delaware C Corp so check corporation and you will file Form 1120. Check that you are starting a new corporation. Date business started is the date you actually started the business. Typically you would look on the paperwork from Delaware and put the date of incorporation. December is the standard closing month for most corporations. Unless you have a significant business reason to pick a different month use Dec. If you plan to pay yourself wages put one. If you don't know put zero. Unless you are fairly sure you will owe payroll taxes the first year check that you will not have payroll or check that your liability will be less than $1,000. Anything else and the IRS will expect you to file quarterly payroll tax returns. Indicate the type of SaaS services you will offer.

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